**[DRAFT ONLY]**

**NEO-CONFUCIANISM, CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE CHINESE STATE**

**Western efforts to fit China into its plans have fluctuated enormously over time. Direct efforts reaching into China seldom succeeded (CIA activities in Tibet come to mind). Indirect influence was sometimes effective and in the reform era highly effective (trade, investment, educational exchange).**

**Voltaire in 18th century France hero-worshipped Confucianism and its bureaucratic fruits. He contrasted priest-ridden France with the secular, this-worldly elite of China. He eagerly sought in Emperor Qian Long’s China an alternative to French Catholicism, which he abhorred as superstitious, non-meritocratic, and bordering on theocracy.**

**Also during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Catholic and later Protestant missionaries were distant from Voltaire’s enthusiastic China-agenda; by direct preaching they hoped to Christianize China. Montesquieu had a philosophic critique of China that was different from the Christian preachers and especially from Voltaire. He used his thin store of information from the East to reject China as oppressive, lacking Europe’s liberty. “The Chinese Empire is a despotic regime,” he declared.**

**Over the last century the West often measured China against liberal rights theory derived from either the Enlightenment or from Christianity. With the fall of China’s last dynasty in 1911, the bullying from Japan’s superior power, and the impact of the 1917 Soviet Revolution, most Chinese thinkers rejected China’s traditions as hopelessly moribund. This departure from the past in a quest for national salvation intensified as the CCP successfully took up the gun amidst Japanese assault and Chinese civil war. In 1949, Mao established a political system with no space for civil society. These years increased the gap between China and Western thinkers and writers who measured China against liberal doctrines including rights theory.**

**In recent times both Chinese and Western critics found China wanting as Mao’s rule added to the gap between China and the West. The Harvard political theorist Barrington Moore proffered a stark phrase “No Bourgeois, No Democracy,” famous in the Western literature ever since. Ii]**

**But decades of Mao’s rule produced little in the way of a middle class. Leaving democracy to one side, it seemed China was on a trajectory different from the West. That has proved true. Class relations would not be the key to China’s further development. Rather, relation to the state of various groups and interests would be the key to a unique hybrid state-society relationship. [ii]**

**It is not surprising that some Chinese intellectuals have recently decried the destruction of Chinese tradition that began with May Four and took an extra twist with Mao-in-Power. Unfortunately, 5/4 and especially CCP rule, skewered tradition almost to the point of death, making the task of thinking afresh about state-society relations difficult. Fang Lizhi took the 5/4 slogan “Mr. Science” as his weapon to flay Beijing, pushing Western rights theory to a new height. Samuel Huntington flatly declared, “Confucian democracy is clearly a contradiction in terms.” [iii]**

**Among other problems, Western rights theory suffers from the awkward term used in Chinese for “Rights.” Both characters in the phrase, Quan (power) and Li (profit) are far from glorious. Certainly they are distant from Confucian values. [iv]**

**Zhang Xianglong at Peking University said, “I am worried that in another 50 years, or 100 years, or 200 years, although the land of China may still be the land of China and the appearances of the Chinese may still be the same, Chinese culture will be totally lost.” [v]**

**Until recently, ever since the late Qing, China’s own philosophic-religious storehouse has seldom been utilized. In fact, China’s civil society has its own distinctive features. Its precursor was an ethical system, self-moving from below (not a transcendental religion from heaven). The Chinese state always had trouble with the latter, but co-existed in reasonable stability with the former. Such a state-society balance would not satisfy Western liberal-rights theorists, but that does not matter since we are talking about China’s future, not the West’s. One notices a jump in books on Confucianism published in the 1990s. Some 200 appeared over a five-year span; Zheng Jiadong says this was richest record of books on the topic since the 5/4 era. [vi]**

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**In the world at large, religion was a growing force in the late 20th century and it still is. In China religion did not decline, as Mao said it would. Globally it has jumped, mostly in new forms, surprising everyone.**

**In this talk I argue that China’s state-society relationship is more stable and satisfactory, not only than in the Mao era, but in many other countries. Apocalyptic religion is largely absent from China today, as it is relatively weak also in the USA and Europe. But many medium and smaller countries are not free from the turmoil and violence brought by the infection of apocalyptic religion into the space often vacant for civil society. What is civil society in today’s Syria? It’s a no-man’s land outside of order or tranquility. Even in Thailand, a Buddhist society notably peaceful for many years, a violent streak has entered “Civil Society.”**

**Of course, many kinds of religion exist, some conducive to civil society co-existing stably with the state, some less so. At various times and places, Evangelical Christianity, Islam, Catholicism (in Communist Poland, for example) all have been in tension with the state. In the former Soviet Union and Mao’s PRC, the politics-religion relationship mostly took the form of a communism-religion tension. Politics was Totalitarian politics. That stark dualism weakened in China, and for different reasons in Russia. Because the Chinese state-society balance has sharply changed, we start with the reality of a hopeful fresh start.**

**But we must also face the reality that the state in China has historically been uniquely dominant in leading, educating, and controlling the life of its people. Indeed, thanks to Mao’s hostility to tradition and the West’s hostility to Mao - largely for his alliance with Moscow - the Chinese state remained omnipresent into the second half of the 20th century, and no role existed for civil society, especially if triggered from abroad. To many observers, Xi Jinping since 2012 has revived and strengthened this role of the party-state. “Wherever the Party goes, you must go,” he declared to the PLA’s 90th birthday celebration on July 30, 2017, and he similarly urged “absolute loyalty” on the media a year earlier. Perhaps President Xi has studied Xun Zi, who wrote, ”Power in the hands of one man is strong. In the hands of two men it is weak.” [vii]**

**In the ultimate pursuit of democracy, which the CCP embraces, what is the role of Chinese society? This premise and question could not have been raised 60 years ago, or even 30 years ago. But today I believe we may envision a Chinese civil society based on neo-Confucianism that partners CCP rule. This would by no means be democracy, but it would offer stability and some justice, and it could be the start of an evolution toward democracy.**

**Such a “Consultative Authoritarianism,” as Jessica Teets calls it [viii] (perhaps reminiscent of Sun Yat-sen’s political tutelage?), would need to be able to develop under authoritarianism but likely be too weak to directly challenge authoritarianism. State-society balances seldom remain unchanged and it’s possible China’s balance would tip back to state domination. But given increased Chinese prosperity, Globalization abroad, the progressive institutionalizing of Beijing politics, and the internationalization of life in Chinese cities, it is more likely the balance will move toward society. [ix]**

**Confucian traditions empha­sized society over individuals and ritual and obligations over rights. Intellec­tuals and the general public, both somewhat unconcerned with individual rights, mostly registered little desire to challenge or limit the power of authority.**

**However, repeatedly China has battled to keep zealous social ideologies at bay. It has fought, and ultimately provided an alternative to such ideologies. These include White Lotus rebels, Boxers, various forms of Rural Chiliaism, Islam, Taiping Rebellion, extreme pro-Westernism in the late 1980s, Falungong from 1999. These and others have de-stabilized China. But after recovering from them all, the Chinese authoritarian state resumed its control of a population imbued with Confucian social-religion.**

**Today, we find a state-society relationship that is to be understood less in class terms than in terms of a “Consultative Authoritarianism” produced by the unique socio-economic development of the post-Mao era. As Alexander Gerschenkron proposed, “late developers” are under pressure to use state power in haste to catch up. [x] China is such a case. Theda Skocpol stresses that successful states in this category are practiced in “the need to maintain control and order.” [xi] As it lagged in the Mao era, Japan, South Korea and other neighbors went ahead, not to speak of the USA and Western Europe. As Chen and Dickson say, late developers lack capital, a trained work force, and advanced tech­nologies. [xii] All three capacities Deng’s China attained through gaige kaifang. The Chinese state had the organizational resources, thanks to CCP rule, and soon the financial capacity, thanks to the unleashing of people’s inventiveness, to quickly catch-up. When the Chinese people prospered they were able to lead a-political lives should they choose to. Most did. The state generally did not object.**

**Confucianism provided a philosophical foundation for state control of society throughout Chinese history. Aspects of Confucian tradition remain in contemporary China, at all levels. The basic norms of society continue to emphasize** **community over individuals and social responsibilities over individual rights. The Chinese bureaucratic elite continues to be unelected. Today, as historically, it is made up of well-edu­cated, professionally competent, and politically reliable officials. They tend to condescend to the masses below. Dong Fangshuo’s warning has not lost its point over recent years: “The most serious crisis of Chinese Culture is that Confucianism represents the values of the intellectual elites, while Western Cul­ture represents the values of the masses. That’s why many Chinese Intellectuals such as Wang Guowei (1877-1927), Liang Qichao (1858-1927) And Yan Fu (1853-1921), who initially intended to seek solutions from the West, turned to Buddhism in the end. The Chinese lack a popular value system. That’s the most serious obstacle to Modernization.” [xiii]**

**Not only an obstacle to modernization, but also to a successful consultative authoritarianism, let alone democracy, as we shall see.**

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**Because Chinese tradition emphasized community and social responsibilities, it was a neat fit for the late-developing Deng-state, which touted socialism with Chinese characteristics. In this fashion China proceeded without displaying the Western “norm” of public-private division, or a civil society fully separate from the state.**

**China’s strong state nevertheless allows some room for initiatives from below on an experimental basis. Chen Weixing refers to this as “getting on the train before purchasing a ticket.” It means boldly conducting activities in areas that current laws or regulations do not explicitly prohibit or are vague about, and then pushing for government policies in support of activities in these areas. This cheeky practice can both further economic growth (as it did in Wenzhou; see below) and reduce dangers arising if economic growth doesn’t prove robust. [xiv]**

**An example was the initiative of local leaders Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang, in two different provinces, after 1978. In Anhui and Sichuan respectively, these province chiefs provided farmers with the opportunity to re­form and then reasoned with Beijing to allow the experi­ments to continue and expand. [xv] In some cities, small- scale enterprises - street vendors, repair shops, and delivery services - emerged after a local green light flashed; later came central party approval.**

**Chinese society entered a period of “routinization,” instead of “revolution,” as often described. People became successful members of society not primarily through government dealings, but as consumers with shops and business units; as employees (possibly of a joint venture involving foreigners); as families doing transactions with rural relatives; as membership in church or cultural associations.**

**In Chen and Dickson’s research, only one group of red capitalists had a significantly higher level of regime support when other variables were held constant: those who formerly had worked as party or government officials [xvi]. Here is yet one more sign of state-private entanglement in China.**

**Overall, the ambiguity in private relations with local government presents opportunities to entrepreneurs, yet poses threats too, especially being sucked into corruption. [xvii] The more prosperous China becomes, the more corruption spreads. In my view this is because huge sums of money slosh back and forth between government and private business, and the scrutiny of these interactions is altered or set aside frequently.**

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**What would the CCP party-state need to concede in order to move toward a smoother - not necessarily sharper - demarcation between state and society?**

**A modern socialist China could move away from an official state ideology. The Caliphate, Stalinism, Taiping-rule, Boxer-rule, Maoism (the 30% of Mao’s ideas that Deng in 1981 said were wrong) such as these should head to the dustbin of history in a flourishing society like China. Beijing might develop a constitution that sets out the principles of socialism without giving the package a teleological label (“end of history” or whatever). The contents would draw heavily on Confucianism.**

**The U.S. Constitution and British common law do this for the fundamental values of their societies. In a different way, Singapore does the same, achieving (in an easier-to-govern society) an authoritarianism less severe than China’s, and a pluralism in civil society a little stronger than China’s.**

**In the former Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 declared the arrival of a “state of the whole people.” Although it was ill-starred because Khrushchev soon fell, the idea behind it was sound. Class antagonism had been overcome, Khrushchev said. In some ways Jiang Zemin’s “three represents” echoes the same idea. China now has essentially overcome class contradictions and the party-state is in theory a state of the whole people. The achievement of a state of the whole people implies a new state-society relationship. Society needs more room to breathe, now that contradictions are non-antagonistic, or “contradictions among the people.” Today, Xi Jinping’s state should be in all respects a state of the whole people.**

**At stake is trust between governors and governed. Since the time of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao the CCP has acknowledged a decline of trust between the Party and many Chinese people. More historical modesty from the top would improve the situation. Communism is not just around the corner. The 1.4 billion Chinese people hold varying views of socialism – not just one. And so on.**

**The Chinese government has not always trusted every segment of its populace with their own minds. Have less suspicion, I suggest, and do less eavesdropping. In the end this might also mean less hospitality to Western ideas; so be it, we are talking about China’s future, not the West’s. Give Confucian social religion a chance to be part of the China Dream. Modernization presumably has an ending. Confucian social-religion, however, does not necessarily have any expiry date.**

**Advantages would also accrue to the government. It is widely observed both by Chinese and foreigners that a vacuum of values exists in China’s public life. The official public philosophy is no longer widely and deeply believed as it once was. PRC rule matures, or tires, as one chooses to see the picture. Declining moral standards are seen as a consequence by some. Others are pleased that Chinese society has entered a period of “routinization,” instead of “revolution.” But the lack of a lively public philosophy is a problem, either way.**

**For a long time and even now, most social organizations, in­cluding entrepreneurial associations, have been officially orga­nized or else they must work via the state. Autonomous professional groups are not generally involved in political affairs, and fully independent political units hardly exist.**

**For interesting and hopeful reasons, the city of Wenzhou is an exception to this picture. Unusually vigorous** **industrial associations in this southeastern city have achieved a relationship with local government marked by significant mutual trust, according to research by Yu Jianxing, Jun Zhou, and Hua Jiang. [xviii] They find that “Chinese civil society grows by participating (italics added).” They say “the flourishing private-run economy provides sufficient financial support for the establishment and development of non-governmental industrial associations.” [xix]**

**Examples of outcomes from the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the Wenzhou Municipal Government, for which the city’s industrial associations were a catalyst, show a deep entanglement of local government with private interests:** **“Opinions on Further Conducting Work on Supervision and Inspection of Shoes Quality in Wenzhou”;** **“Implementation Opinions on Cracking Down on Activities of Making and Selling Counterfeit and Inferior Goods”; “Notice on Rectification of Production and Distribution of Deformed Steel Bars.”**

**Several vital demographic issues require correct policies at the center, but also understanding and action, in Wenzhou and elsewhere, at local government and sub-government levels. The increasing “gray population” is one; the imbalance between male and female births is a second. About 11% of China’s people in 2016 were sixty-five or older, a very high figure internationally. Male births currently outnumber female by a ratio of 1.15, again a very high imbalance by world standards. In these instances, past policy from Beijing will shape the immediate macro-future whatever is done or not done. But at the margins, pressure, compassion, “moral suasion,”[[1]](#endnote-1) and family foresight have an impact government cannot match. No wonder local officials praise the contribution of non-government groups: “Industrial associations in Wenzhou have become a significant social force for governments,” [xix] the researchers conclude.**

**Of course, long experience with a Confucian-influenced state [xx] has been reinforced by seven decades of Leninist rule. But the ingenious hybrid of China’s economic arrangements has in recent decades softened this second institutional legacy. In a context of Globalization, huge trade, record-breaking foreign investment, and soaring cultural and educational exchanges, China seems, in some areas more than in others, to have gone beyond strong-state, weak-society, to strong-state AND strong-society.**

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**Yet there is one brick wall limiting so-called Consultative Authoritarianism, making it remain a destination in itself, rather than a stepping-stone to a post-authoritarian political system. For it leaves untouched the meritocratic system of choosing the top leader. This is not to say Consultative Authoritarianism is not a worthy goal in itself, for improved governance and participation. But democracy at the top of the political system is not going to spring from civil society.**

**Evaluation Democracy, a term coined by Chinese scholar Chen Fangren in a brilliant unpublished essay, [xxi] is Eastern meritocracy. Virtuous leaders are chosen by colleagues. Later, the chosen leader must listen to colleagues and public opinion as both “evaluate” his performance from below.**

**In the West’s Election Democracy, universal suffrage votes in leaders, but between elections, according to Dr. Chen, leaders may or may not listen to grass roots views. When leftist Americans lose an election, for example, they turn to**

**street politics, strikes, and litigation. In parallel fashion, some conservatives prefer purity on the sidelines to the compromises required for electoral victory.**

**Today in the U.S., Europe, Japan, Australia, and other democracies, constant polls, media barrage, the centrality of personality, and enormous sums of money have certainly reduced the degree of faith in elections.**

**Chinese scholar Chen finds the magic of Evaluation Democracy in four thousand years of Chinese history. “Continuous consent to govern” allows emperors and politicians alike to “focus on proper results for the common good” and not the grand opera of multiparty struggles. “Average people” are too busy with their private lives to “take on the heavy burden” of selecting leaders “fit for office.”**

**But continuous consent to rule in Evaluation Democracy has been, throughout Chinese history, and is anywhere, tricky to pull off. In today’s China, meddling by “retired” leaders has diluted “citizen evaluation” of current leaders. Dr. Chen, for all his knowledge, fails to see how often power struggles creep into his dreamland of continuous consent.**

**The Beijing Model, as I call the current no-elections version, “leaves the selection of a government to government leaders themselves [a holy circle], who have in-depth knowledge of each other” and know “what it takes to be an effective leader.” Dr. Chen clings to an ideal that in history worked sometimes but not always.**

**One Chinese adviser to Xi Jinping has recently said: “East European countries [after Communism’s collapse] chose the Western mode and allowed various interest groups to build their own parties. In China, however, political openness comes from the inside.” [xxii] Time will tell how far political openness that comes (and goes) from the top can proceed.**

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**Starting with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, Beijing made an adjustment to the reform agenda by trying to address economic inequality, instead of focusing on economics standing alone. [xxiii] Xi Jinping has carried this further. It amounts to an efficiency-to-equity switch that puts the spotlight on society. These leaders have acknowledged ills accompanying China’s economic development. Xi Jinping once told Russian TV that in the first years of reform, “China took all the advantages, and what is left are only difficulties.” Some of these stared Xi in the face as his era began in 2012.**

**Certain ills have eroded China’s social solidarity and caused disharmony in society. One cannot say life is “full of trust and love,” as Chen Weixing characterizes the harmonious society of Hu’s ideal. [xxiv] Many of the issues concern policies of social justice, but at stake in all of them is the legitimacy of the CCP and the stability of Chinese society.**

**In the USA, lack of harmony is periodically checked by elections. Politics is cacophonous but it is dealt with by an election whose verdict all sides accept. The system periodically stills disharmony. Elections vaccinate U.S. society against disharmony’s worst fruits of violence and paralysis. In China this remedy does not exist. Disharmony can be bottled up, which many say is worse than cacophony punctuated by elections.**

**Margaret Pearson argues that contrary to the assump­tions of many Westerners, private businessmen seldom push for political change. They have sided with the current authoritarian state and shunned democracy. Instead, they favor a relationship with the state that Pearson labels a “socialist corporatism” that is “designed by the CCP.” [xxv]**

**At worst this could resemble Mussolini’s left-right muddle: “**[**The definition of fascism is the marriage of corporation and state**](http://www.azquotes.com/quote/699055)**,” the Italian leader said in the 1930s. “Democracy is talking itself to death,” he added rudely. “It is beautiful in theory. In practice it is a fallacy. You [people] in America will see that someday.”**

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**Probably, while civil society can grow under authoritarianism, with definite benefits to all, it is unlikely to remodel the Chinese state. But it is already more than a palliative. A learning process proceeds in a thousand ways, and a verdict has not yet been reached on the eventual outcome. All this is not to deny that the stability of China’s present situation has great benefit in itself.**

**Marx wrote in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: “The anatomy of the human being is the key to the anatomy of the ape. But the intimations of a higher animal in lower ones can be understood only if the animal of the higher order is already known.” So, in assessing the prospects of China’s unique hybrid party-state, we don’t know, strictly speaking, what we are looking for.**

**In Britain a century ago, there arose a social democratic idea of individual self-fulfillment seen as achieved only within community. This approach is much closer to Confucianism than is liberal rights theory. Joseph Raz maintains that rights are actually the grounds of duties. [xxvi]. R. H. Tawney, a British Labor theorist, would have agreed. The Briton defined his ideal as “socialism as fellowship.” This phrase I chose as the title of my book on Tawney’s thought. [xxvii]**

**A people as conscious of duty as the Chinese, would find Raz’s suggestion much more acceptable than the usual liberal rights theory. Mencius’s idea of the governors’ duty to the governed is an analogue to Raz’s point about the rights-duties connection. “The people are the most important part of the state,” said Mencius, an outlier in ancient China. “The community comes next, and the sovereign is the least important.”**

**Zhou Zhenghuan correctly remarks that “establishing or defining a collective identity is not always an easy thing to do.” [xxviii] That’s an understatement. But in the philosophy of Tawney, establishing a collective identity is unnecessary. Socialism requiring fellowship does not involve a search for “collective rights.” Individual rights in Tawney’s sense is enough, for it posits that true self-fulfillment for any individual comes through his relations with his fellows. Virtually a Confucian idea. One must admit this British socialist (and Confucian) notion differs from typical American rights theories.**

**Certainly there are difficulties to overcome in China’s state-society balance. It is a barrier that Confucianism is more rooted in the family-based agriculture of rural China, than in the cities, where western individualist cultural influence is strong. Yet China is urbanizing by the year. Could part of Chinese society become deracinated?**

**Hall and Ames write: “Healthy Confucian societies are largely self-regulating and thus have required a minimum of government.” [xxix] That can hardly be true of the party-state’s huge role in today’s economic and financial life.**

**Another problem: It is not always clear whether “China’s capitalists” are part of society or part of the state. In the former Soviet Union, large state firms were not very numerous. Privatization brought a concentration of wealth to a few lucky “oligarchs,” as some call them. By contrast, in China the fruits of privatization accrue to a huge number of beneficiaries. [xxx] Are they all capitalists?**

**In the first half of the 20th century, the urgent cause of Chinese national salvation smothered thinking about rights and social values. This could happen again, if China should experience an economic or international setback.**

**In any future scenario, regional variation in regime support must be weighed. Part of the folk wisdom of Chinese politics is that political conformity is highest in Beijing and tapers off in regions far from the capital. “Regime support was highest in Shandong,” Chen and Dickson write of their research, “the northernmost province in our study, and declined steadily farther south.” [xxxi] Of course, if the state is impacted by civil society far more in the south than in the north, this could endanger China’s unity.**

**I return to Montesquieu for a prescient word on sociopolitical evolution: “When societies first come to birth,” he wrote in Spirit of the Laws, “it is the leader who produces the institutions.” In China, that was the Mao era. “Later it is the institutions which produce the leaders,” the French philosopher added. With some doubts, this seems increasingly the case in post-Mao China. From now on, more and more, socioeconomic and perhaps political innovation will come from below as well as from above. [xxxii] This bodes well for Confucianism’s role in the state-society balance in China.**

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**ENDNOTES**

**[i] Moore, 418.**

**[ii] Chen and Dickson, 155, 159.**

**[iii] Huntington, The Third Wave, 78 ??**

**[iv] Zhou, 186-87.**

**[v] Zhang Xianglong, Interview, Feng Lin.** **21 shiji zhongguo da yuce.**

**[vi] Zheng Jiadong, Interview, Feng Lin. 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce.**

**[vii] Cited in Zhou, 186.**

**[viii] Teets, Chapter 1.**

**[ix] Some research concludes that prosperity is not always a good predictor of the appearance of democracy, e.g. Przeworski and Limongi, 161.**

**[x] Gerschenkron, 7, 14, passim.**

**[xi] The state-centered development paradigm is explored by Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” Peter Evans, Dietrich Rue-Schemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds (1985). Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press, 9.**

**[xii] Chen and Dickson, 7.**

**[xiii] Dong Fangshuo, Interview, Feng Lin, 21 shiji zhongguo da yuce.**

**[xiv] Yu, et. al. Chapter 2.`**

**[xv] Zhao, Chapter 2.**

**[xvi] Chen and Dickson, 152.**

**[xvii] Ibid, 159.**

**[xviii] Yu, et. al., Chapter 7 and 8.**

**[xix] Ibid., 180.**

**[xx] Schram, ed. xi (Schram), Foreword (Bunger) and Introduction (Gernet).**

**[xxi] Soon to be expanded into a book, published in Singapore.**

**[xxii], Xi Jinping advisor to the author**

**[xxiii] See Baogang Guo on a period of “Politics of Equity,” a departure from the “Politics of Efficiency;” in Hua and Guo, 24ff.**

**[xxiv] Chen, In Hua and Guo, 13.**

**[xxv] Pearson; also, Chen and Dickson, 5**

**[xxvi] Raz, 195.**

**[xxvii] Terrill (1973). Socialism as Fellowship: the political philosophy of R.H.Tawney. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.**

**[xxviii] Cited in Zhou, 198.**

**[xxix] Hall and Ames, 15.**

**[xxx] Chen and Dickson, 156.**

**[xxxi] Ibid, 152.**

**[xxxii]** **This below-above dynamic admixture will be the topic of another essay.**

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1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)